A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels by Goncalves, Ricardo & Ray, Indrajit
Economics Letters 159 (2017) 177–179
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Economics Letters
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels✩
Ricardo Gonçalves a, Indrajit Ray b,*
a Católica Porto Business School and CEGE, Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Rua Diogo Botelho, 1327, 4169-005 Porto, Portugal
b Economics Section, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Colum Drive, Cardiff CF10 3EU, UK
h i g h l i g h t s
• We analyse a Japanese–English auction with fixed bid levels for the wallet game.
• We prove that bidding twice the value of the private signal is never an equilibrium.
• We show that there is a discontinuity in the equilibrium set from discrete to continuous.
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a b s t r a c t
It is well-known that in the wallet game with two bidders, bidding twice the (individual) signal is an
equilibrium. We prove that this strategy is never an equilibrium in a Japanese–English auction once
discrete bid levels are introduced; we also discuss the implications of this result.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Milgrom andWeber (1982) analysed a particular version of the
English auction, the so-called Japanese–English Auction (hence-
forth JEA), commonly known as a clock auction, in which the price
of the object increases continuously and the bidders must keep on
pressing a button whilst they are interested in buying the object
at the posted price; the auction ends when all but one bidder
release the button. Later, Klemperer (1998) focused on a particular
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common value auction with two bidders, popularly known as the
wallet game (in which the common value is simply the sum of two
private signals, the ‘‘wallets’’), as a special case of the above model
and illustrated that bidding twice the (individual) signal forms the
unique symmetric (Bayesian–Nash) equilibrium in this game.
In realworld examples of auctions of different formats, the price
actually increases in discrete increments. In the recent past, English
auctions with predefined discrete bid levels have been analysed
(Rothkopf andHarstad, 1994; Yu, 1999; Sinha andGreenleaf, 2000;
Cheng, 2004; David et al., 2007; Isaac et al., 2007); in these studies,
bidders have to choose among the exogenously fixed bid levels
when it is their turn to bid (Rothkopf and Harstad, 1994; David et
al., 2007) or at the very least, increase the going bid by a minimum
increment (Isaac et al., 2007). Yu (1999) observes that English
auctions with discrete bids are likely to yield different equilibrium
strategies from their continuous counterpart.
Following the seminal experiment byAvery andKagel (1997) on
a continuous-bid JEA based on the wallet game, not much further
theoretical and experimental literature has emerged on this issue,
with the exception of Gonçalves and Hey (2011). One should note
that the existing (above-mentioned) literature on discrete bids,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.032
0165-1765/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
178 R. Gonçalves, I. Ray / Economics Letters 159 (2017) 177–179
in the context of single object auctions, has focussed almost en-
tirely on private value environments (for example, Rothkopf and
Harstad, 1994); virtually nothing has been done for the common
value model. There is a vast literature on both multi-object and
multi-unit auctions, some of which considers discrete bidding.
However, this literature also mainly refers to private values; for
example, Brusco and Lopomo (2002) look at multi-object simul-
taneous ascending auctions with private values and complemen-
tarities across objects. Ausubel (2004) proposes a novel multi-unit
ascending bid auction for homogeneous goods, both with private
as well as with interdependent values (a generalisation of both
the private and common value models) and models the auction
through a price clock with either integer (steps) or continuous
increments; interestingly and of relevance to our work, in Ausubel
(2004), discrete increments are only used in the private values
case while the ascending auction with interdependent values is
analysed under continuous bid increments.
We, in this note, consider a set-up similar to the usual JEA,
except that the price goes up in discrete commonly known bid
levels. As in the usual JEA, if a bidder wants to drop out, all he
has to do is release the button. The final auction price is equal to
the highest bid level at which at least one bidder was active. We
focus on the wallet game. To the best of our knowledge, nobody
so far has theoretically analysed the equilibria of a common value
environment like the wallet game, using JEA with exogenously
specified discrete bid levels.
We prove that one cannot construct a symmetric equilibrium
using bids that are twice the private signal (as in the case of
continuous bid levels illustrated by Klemperer, 1998). Our result
is somewhat similar to the one in Isaac et al. (2007) which, in a
private values setting, shows that the equilibrium strategies in a
continuous bid setting do not extend to a discrete bid environment,
focusing on jump bidding equilibria in their set-up. Further re-
search in this area should follow this note, as our result implies that
the equilibria in this environment are inherently more complex,
with obvious implications on the design of such auctions.
2. Model
We consider the wallet game inwhich there are two symmetric
risk-neutral bidders i ∈ {1, 2}who compete for the purchase of one
single good, whose value, V˜ , is common but ex ante unknown to
both bidders. Each bidder receives an independent and uniformly
distributed1 private signal xi ∼ U (0, 1), i = 1, 2. The (ex ante)
unknown common value of the good is simply the sum of the two
signals: V˜ = x1 + x2.
We make use of the JEA with some exogenously fixed discrete
bids. In our set up, as in the usual JEA, the price increases; however
the bid levels are discrete (rather than continuous) and are fixed
exogenously. Formally, the bid levels are the elements of the set
A = {a1, . . . , ak}, with 0 < a1 < · · · < ak < 2, k ≥ 2 a finite
integer; the set A is common knowledge to the bidders. We will
denote a typical bid level by aj, for j = 1, . . . , k, with the implicit
assumption that a0 = 0 and ak+1 = 2, for notational convenience
whenever required in this paper.
The commonly-known (publicly displayed) auction price goes
up in discrete bid levels in the set A starting from a1 and ending at
ak. The bidders have to keep pressing a button at each bid level to
be actively bidding; if a bidder wants to drop out of the auction at
any stage, all he has to do is release the button. The final auction
price is equal to the highest bid level in which at least one bidder
was active. This rule implies that, for any j = 1, . . . , k − 1, if
one bidder is active at aj but not at aj+1 while his opponent is
1 The uniform distribution is undoubtedly easier to compute solutions for, how-
ever, any other specific distribution should not matter in our analysis.
active at aj+1, then the latter wins the auction and pays a price
equal to aj+1; by contrast, if both bidders are active at aj, but not
at aj+1, then the auction winner is decided at random with equal
probabilities and the final price is aj; finally, if both bidders are
active at the last bid level ak, the winner will be chosen at random
with equal probabilities and will pay the price ak. The net payoff
to the (selected) winner in each of the above cases is the realised
value of x1+ x2 minus the price to pay while the payoff to the loser
is 0. If no bidder is active at a1, then the auction ends immediately
and the payoff to either bidder is 0.
A strategy in this Bayesian game is therefore to choose (as in the
standard JEA) a drop out bid level as a function of the signal. Given
a signal x ∈ (0, 1), a bidding strategy for a player thus chooses
0 (which implies that the bidder is not active even at a1) or a bid
level aj so that the bidder will be active at aj but not at aj+1, where
j = 1, . . . , k (with ak+1 = 2). We denote a typical strategy by σ
which is a function dented by b(x) ∈ {0, a1, . . . , ak}, which implies
that the player with signal x is active until b(x).
The JEA for the wallet game with k bid levels (a1, . . . , ak) as
described above will henceforth be called Gk.
3. Results
As it is well-known, the symmetric (Bayesian–Nash) equilib-
rium for the JEA with continuous bids is given by bid functions
b∗i (xi) = 2xi, i = 1, 2, as derived by Milgrom and Weber (1982),
in a general model, and later specifically for the wallet game by
Klemperer (1998) and Avery and Kagel (1997). A relevant question,
therefore, is whether these equilibrium strategies also form an
equilibrium in the JEA with discrete bids for the wallet game or
not.
A direct translation of the above (continuous) JEA bidding
strategies into our setting would yield the following bidding strat-
egy: each bidder i should stay active in the auction until the bid
reaches b∗i (xi) = 2xi and drop out after that, that is, each bidder i
will choose 0 if 2xi < a1 (equivalent to xi <
a1
2 ) and will choose
aj ∈ A (active at bid level aj but would drop out at bid level aj+1) if
aj ≤ 2xi < aj+1 (equivalent to aj2 ≤ xi <
aj+1
2 ), for j = 1, . . . , k− 1
and will choose ak if 2xi > ak (equivalent to xi >
ak
2 ). Let us call
this strategy the ‘‘twice-signal bidding’’. We show that this bidding
strategy in our setting is not an equilibrium.
Proposition 1. The twice-signal bidding strategy profile is not an
equilibrium in Gk.
Proof. We will prove Proposition 1 by showing that there are
signal realisations forwhich there exists someprofitable individual
deviation for a bidder. We will illustrate this using bidder 1’s
strategy. Without loss of generality, suppose x1 > x2 where x1
and x2 are the signals of two respective bidders; further assume
that for some j, j = 1, . . . , k, aj−1 ≤ 2x2 < aj ≤ 2x1 < aj+1
(assume a0 = 0 and ak+1 = 2 if required). Hence, following the
twice-signal bidding strategy, bidder 2 would be active at bid level
aj−1 but would drop out at bid level aj while bidder 1 would be
active at aj - the price that bidder 1, the winning bidder, would
pay. Note that bidder 1 ’s expected payoff, conditional on winning
at aj, is given by:
π1 = x1 + E
[
X2|aj−12 ≤ X2 <
aj
2
]
− aj
2
= x1 +
aj−1
2 +
aj
2
2
− aj
which is equal to x1 + aj−14 − 34aj.
Now suppose, bidder 1’s signal realisation is ‘too low’ within
the chosen interval aj2 ≤ x1 <
aj+1
2 , that is x1 =
aj
2 + ε for
some small ε > 0. In this case, he will find the expected value of
the good to be lower than aj, thus yielding negative profits. This
is because in such a case, bidder 1’s expected payoff π1 will be
aj
2 + ε+
aj−1
4 − 34aj =
aj−1−aj
4 + ε < 0, for an appropriately chosen
small ε. ■
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Clearly, there is a discontinuity in the fact that the twice-signal
bidding strategy is an equilibrium in the continuous case but not
so in the discrete case. We prove this formally.
Proposition 2. The twice-signal bidding strategy profile is not an
equilibrium in Gk, for any finite k, but is an equilibrium in the cor-
responding game with continuous bids.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the proof of Propo-
sition 1. Consider any natural number k and thus a JEA with k
many bid levels. Take the minimum of the distances between two
successive bid levels and call it δ; hence, for any j, aj − aj−1 ≥ δ.
One can now choose a small enough ε such that ε < δ/4. Now, in
the case mentioned in last line of the proof of Proposition 1 above,
bidder 1’s expected payoff (π1 = aj−1−aj4 + ε) will definitely be
strictly negative. Hence, the twice-signal bidding strategy profile
is not an equilibrium in the JEA with kmany discrete bids, for any
finite k, while as we already know (Klemperer, 1998), twice-signal
bidding does constitute an equilibrium in the continuous case. ■
4. Conclusion
Wehave shown that the standard equilibrium (of bidding twice
the signal) in JEA with continuous bid levels is not an equilibrium
in a setting where bid levels are discrete for the wallet game.
The intuition behind our result is clear. In the continuous equi-
librium (Klemperer, 1998), the pivotal event on which a bidder’s
decision to bid up to a price conditional on winning is that the
rival’s signal equals half the price. However, by contrast, with
discrete bid levels, this pivotal event is that upon winning the
auction, the rival’s signal only belongs to an interval (between two
discrete bid levels) and the winning bidder’s expected value of the
wallet thus is lower than the price he would pay by bidding twice
the signal.
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